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Abstract 
Numeraire choice is often deemed a problem of purely analytical convenience. In this paper 
I show that there is more to numeraire selection than meets the eye for the formulation of 
monetary policy in countries with weak fiscal institutions. I show how (a) improper 
numeraire choice can dramatically overstate or understate Central Bank profits and (b) how 
this can threaten the ability of a Central Bank to keep inflation under control. I show point 
(a) in the context of Monte Carlo experiments calibrated for the Venezuelan economy and 
point (b) in an infinitely lived representative agent model that illustrates the problem of 
joint determination of the ideal level of foreign currency reserves and of the desired level of 
transfers of Central Bank profits to the Treasury when the objective is to eliminate the 
possibility of a hyperinflation. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper I study two important but often overlooked themes in the formulation of
monetary policy in many developing countries: (1) whether and how Central Banks profits
(positive changes in net worth of the Central Bank) should be transferred to the Treasury 
and (2) how much foreign currency reserves should the Central Bank hold. While the 
natural temptation for a Central Banker is to indefinitely accumulate net worth and foreign
currency reserves to aid it its mission of controlling inflation, such accumulation has
naturally an opportunity cost as society may find many alternative uses to those resources. 
Hence, the need to come up with sensible principles that would help the Central Bank in a 
developing country determine the adequate level of net worth transfer to the Treasury and 
the ideal level of foreign currency reserves to hold to prevent a hyperinflationary crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is to study how these two questions are related and to provide a
framework which enables us to provide answers to those questions that are consistent with
the Central Bank’s ability to keep inflation under control. Interestingly, a seemingly 
irrelevant issue for analytical purposes, that of numeraire choice, becomes crucial for a 
proper understanding of the mistakes a Central Bank can make in the design of profit 
transfer rules, and how a Central Bank must compensate for this mistake under the form of 
higher foreign currency reserves, if it wishes to avoid a hyperinflation. To illustrate some of 
the points I make I use the Venezuelan economy as an example but it is clear that the issues
raised here are relevant for many other developing countries as well. 
1.1 Preview of the results 
Two sets of results are presented in this article. The first group of results relate to issues of
proper computation of central bank profits. The second group of results relates to issues 
related to the uses that ought to be given to those profits and how they relate to ideal 
foreign reserve levels. 
The main issue studied in this paper is that many central banks in developing countries sell 
hard currency at a price that is usually higher than the price they paid for it and hence 
derive a profit given by the difference between the selling and the buying price. Because 
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the worth of a unit of hard currency is, in its own terms, always equal to one, many central 
bankers assert that the bulk of those profits are purely accounting profits, therefore not real,
and therefore should not be transferred to the Treasury. In this paper I hold those assertions 
to be only partially true. 
I also argue that numeraire selection turns to be critical for proper computation of Central 
Bank profits. Big positive profits under a certain numeraire may be zero or negative 
according to a different numeraire.  
Once the proper numeraire has been chosen one is left with yet another problem: that of
appropriate inventory valuation method among, for example, the well-known methods such 
as first in first out (FIFO), last in first out (LIFO), weighed average and so on. In a separate 
paper (Zambrano, 2005) I argue that weighted average is the most appropriate method to 
use in this context as it treats the units that remain in inventory and the units sold in a 
symmetrical manner.  
To see the importance that numeraire selection and inventory valuation method may have 
in practice I use Monte Carlo Experiments calibrated to fit the Venezuelan economy to 
highlight the dramatic differences that using different methods produced on the 
computation of Central Bank profits. 
The second group of results relate to issues regarding the uses that ought to be given to 
those profits and how they relate to ideal foreign reserve levels. In many developing 
countries, Venezuela included, those issues are dealt with separately. To study this further I 
use an infinitely lived representative agent model that was developed by Sims (2005) to 
study the connections between the balance sheet of the Central Bank and of the Treasury.  
An important lesson that I draw from my analysis is that how much of the Central Bank 
profits to transfer and how much foreign reserves to have should be determined jointly. In 
particular, the study of the net worth of the Central Bank allows me to determine a
“critical” level of foreign currency reserves that eliminates the technical feasibility of a 
hyperinflationary crisis. When foreign currency sales drive reserves below such critical 
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level Central Bank profits should not be transferred because they are necessary to replace 
the desired level of reserves without eroding the level of net worth of the Central Bank. On 
the other hand, when foreign currency sales situate reserves above such critical level, 
Central Bank profits can safely be transferred to the Treasury without this undermining the
Central Bank’s ability to keep inflation under control. 
The structure of the rest of this article is as follows. In Section 2 I discuss conceptually and 
through examples the issue regarding numeraire choice and how it determines the existence 
or non-existence of Central Bank profits. In Section 3 I discuss issues regarding proper 
computation of such profits and present Monte Carlo experiments done for the Venezuelan 
economy that illustrate the cost of employing improper methods of computation of Central 
Bank profits. In Section 4 I use a model by Sims (2005) to study the connections between 
price stability, transfer of profits to the Treasury and the desired level foreign currency 
reserves. I present some conclusions in Section 5. 
2. Are Central Bank profits real? 
Our analysis must begin with the question of the very existence of Central Bank profits. A 
Central Bank typically keeps a stock of foreign currency and other liquid foreign assets. 
Those assets could be the source of profits in several ways: when the assets are sold, when 
the assets appreciate in value, and when the assets have an intrinsic real return (such as 
interest paid by bonds and the like). Profits due to sales are those that arise when the 
Central Bank sells the asset at a price higher than the one it takes to replace it (the 
opportunity cost). Profits due to asset appreciation arise when the price at which one may 
replace the asset exceeds the price one paid for the asset. Finally, the profits due to the 
intrinsic return of the asset are self-explanatory. 
In the Venezuelan case profits due to sales are minimal as there is a set price markup of 
about 0.4% between the price at which the Central Bank sells currency and the price at 
which it buys. Profits due to the intrinsic return of the asset are low, stable, and do not
generate much debate as to their proper use. Profits due to asset appreciation, however, can 
be quite sizable, as the Central Bank tends to hold foreign assets in its inventory for quite
3
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
some time before they decide to sell them. It turns out that the size of those profits can vary 
dramatically depending on the specifics of how they are computed.  
There is an ample debate among Central Bank economists in developing countries about 
these matters. A prominent view among Central Bankers is that, because the worth of a unit 
of hard currency is, in its own terms, always equal to one, profits from asset appreciation 
are viewed as purely accounting profits, therefore not real, and therefore should not be 
transferred to the treasury. From my standpoint, however, whether they are right or not 
about this simply depends on numeraire choice, as the simple example below shows: 
Example 1. An investor buys 12,100 shares of a company in the stock market at a price of 
100 bills (the domestic currency) per share. Those shares go up in price to 121 bills per
share; hence the investor is wealthier by an amount equal to 254,100 bills. The argument 
given by the Central Bankers above applied to this case would suggest that, since the 
number of shares held by the investor hasn’t changed, distributing the profits back to the 
investor would require selling 2,100 shares, leaving him with a final capital of only 10.000 
shares. 
The problem with this argument, of course, is that an investor is not really interested in the 
final number of shares (or bills) in his portfolio but instead on the purchasing power of 
those shares and bills. A proper computation of profits then entails computing the change in
net worth by estimating price changes of the assets in the portfolio in terms of the units of
the goods that the investor typically consumes. 
Example 1. (cont.) Assume the typical basket of goods the investor normally buys initially 
costs 100 bills and then it increases to 110 bills. This means that the value of the initial
wealth in terms of consumption baskets is 12,100 baskets. After all prices change in the 
4
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
economy the final value of wealth is now 13,310 baskets, which means price changes leave 
the investor with a profit equal to 1,210 baskets, that is 133,100 bills.   
This leaves us with three estimates of the size of profits: our initial estimate of 254,100 bills
(the one that would be preferred by the Treasury), the subsequent estimate of zero bills (the 
one preferred by the Central Bankers), and our intermediate estimate of 133,100 bills. It is 
immediate that each estimate is correct relative to a particular choice of numeraire: the first 
estimate arises out of the choice of bills as numeraire, the second estimate arises out of the 
choice of shares as numeraire, and the third estimate arises out of the choice of baskets as
numeraire.   
The example, simple as it is, reveals two basic yet somewhat subtle principles of modern 
microeconomic theory: 
(α) The sign and magnitude of certain comparative static exercises may critically depend 
on numeraire choice3. 
(β) Proper numeraire choice ought to depend on the preferences of the underlying decision 
makers of the economic problem under study.4 
Hence, the themes of existence and magnitude of Central Bank profits are intimately 
linked. They are linked through the subtle issue of numeraire choice.  
3. The computation of Central Bank profits  
So, how to determine which is the proper numeraire to use? Fortunately, principle (β) 
above provides an answer to this question: even when profits are a residual of Central Bank 
operations, what a society wishes to know when measuring the balance sheet of the Central 
Bank is how much in the way of real resources it costs to society to keep the Central Bank 
in operation, so that they can compare those costs to the benefits (measured also as real
3 See, e.g,., Mas Colell (1991),  Zambrano and Vogelsang (2000) and  Nachbar (2002 ). 
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resources ultimately deemed for consumption) of having a modern Central Bank. It seems,
then, that the proper numeraire is the so-called basket of goods that the typical member of 
society consumes. 
Once the proper numeraire has been chosen then the issue becomes one of appropriate 
valuation of the inventory of foreign currency.5 In a separate paper (Zambrano, 2005) I 
argue that “weighted average6” is the most appropriate method to use in this context as it 
treats the units that remain in inventory and the units sold in a symmetrical manner. 
In short, in this article I argue that the proper numeraire is the typical consumption basket 
of the representative agent and that the proper inventory valuation method is the so-called 
“weighted average” method. In the next sub-section I show the discrepancies that may 
ensue from using other numeraires or inventory valuation methods.  
3.1 The cost of improper computation of Central Bank profits 
To illustrate the differences that exist between the different methods I performed Monte 
Carlo experiments on the size of the profits due to asset appreciation that would accrue over 
one semester in Venezuela. The parameters of the random variables used in the experiments 
were estimated from data from the Venezuelan economy for the period 1990-2003. The 
details are in Appendix 1. I present summary statistics of the simulations in Table 1.  
4 See Grodal and Dierker (1999) 
5 This becomes an issue since the Central Bank typically sells at any given moment a fraction of the reserves 
it holds, reserves it typically bought at different moments in time, at different prices. Hence, the need to
decide, for the purpose of computation of profits, “which of the units were the ones sold” and which of the
units remain in the inventory. 
6 A method by which the cost of each unit sold at a moment in time is simply the average cost of all the units 
in stock at the moment the sale takes place. 
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Table 1 

Simulated semester-long Central Bank Profits for two numeraires and three 

inventory valuation methods for the Venezuelan economy 

Summary Statistics

 (Billions of Bolívares)
 
Numeraire: Bolívar 
(domestic currency)
Numeraire: 
Domestic CPI consumption 
baskets
FIFO LIFO 
Weighted 
Avg. 
FIFO LIFO 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Mean 3.5 0.3 1.9 -0.9 -0.1 -0.5 
Stdev 4.4 0.8 2.5 3.1 0.5 1.7 
t 1.261 2.963 1.352 -3.328 -4.321 -3.056 
Prob. (U<=0) 17% 61% 18% 55% 81% 56% 
Percentil 5% (1) -3.3 -0.2 -2.1 -7.1 -1.1 -4.0 
Percentil 95%
(2) 
11.5 1.7 6.3 2.8 0.3 1.5 
(2)-(1) 14.8 1.9 8.5 10.0 1.3 5.6 
Below I summarize the lessons derived from the analysis of the simulations. 
1. When the numeraire is the dollar profits are identically zero, regardless of inventory 
valuation method. 
2. When the numeraire is the domestic currency (the Bolivar in the case of Venezuela) the 
inventory valuation method is of great importance. The estimated expected value of Central 
Bank profits is thirteen times higher when using FIFO as inventory valuation method 
relative to the case when LIFO is used. The dispersion of profits is also higher under FIFO 
relative to LIFO. The results regarding the weighted average method are somewhere in 
between, as expected. 
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3. When the numeraire is the basket of goods represented in the Venezuelan CPI in the 
majority of the simulations we observe Central Bank losses rather than profits.7 Inventory 
valuation methods do not affect the sign of the profits but they affect their magnitude. The 
estimated expected losses are eight times higher under FIFO than under LIFO. 
4. A fourth related lesson has to do with the following: Central Bankers routinely measure 
the changes in net worth of their Central Banks in terms of domestic currency and employ 
the FIFO inventory valuation method to minimize their size. What the simulations reveal is 
that such combination is far from being a good substitute for the prescription of using the 
domestic consumption baskets as numeraire: while it is true that LIFO understates profits 
relative to FIFO when the domestic currency is numeraire, FIFO also underestimates losses 
relative to any other inventory valuation method when the domestic consumption basket 
acts as numeraire. Hence, FIFO does not really do the job of protecting the net worth of the 
Central Bank in an environment of real exchange rate appreciation. 
The discussion above and all the other statistics presented in Table 1 reveal that different 
methods for estimating Central Bank profits have substantial consequences on their sign 
and magnitude. In Section 4 below I examine the macroeconomic implications of using an 
improper method of computation of Central Bank profits.   
4. Macroeconomic implications: desired foreign reserve levels, Central Bank profit 
transfer rules, and price stability 
To better understand the problems that could arise from improper profit transfer from the
Central Bank to the Treasury I use a model by Sims (2005), where the balance sheet of the 
Treasury and of the Central Bank are not consolidated. The contribution of this Section is
that I use this model to study the effect of varying the profit transfer rules on several 
macroeconomic variables. The model allows us to understand when it is desirable and when 
7 This is of course related with the real exchange rate appreciation that took place in Venezuela during the
period out of which the data employed to compute the parameters of the simulations was extracted.
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it is undesirable to transfer Central Bank profits to the Treasury in a country with weak 
fiscal institutions. 
4.1 The model 
The economy is composed of infinitely lived agents who face the problem:  
∞ ∫ −βt tMax e logC dt        (1)  Ct 0 
By choice of C, Fp, B and M subject to: 
& &M + B rB&C(1+ψ (v))+ Fp + = Y + ρFp + +τ (2)P P 
The interpretation is as follows: at every instant the representative agent must choose how 
much to consume (C), how much to save in nominal government bonds (B), how much to 
save in real assets (Fp), and how much wealth to keep under the form of money (M).  
At every instant the sources of funds are equal to the sum of the agents’ real income (Y), 
the return on the agent’s real investments (ρ Fp, where ρ is the real interest rate), the return
on government bond holdings (rB/P, where r is the nominal interest rate and P is the price 
level) and the government transfers (τ). 
Each agent uses his real resources in accumulating real assets ( F& p ), government bonds 
& &(B M), real money balances ( P), in consuming, and in “facilitating consumption.” TheP 
meaning of “facilitating consumption” is as follows: if the agent wishes to consume an 
amount C of goods, it must purchase an amount equal to C(1+ψ (v)) of goods. The 
expression ψ (v) captures the cost of making transactions in the economy and it is an 
increasing function of the velocity of money (v), defined here as v=PC/M. Hence, the 
higher the agent’s money holdings, the lower the transaction costs incurred for by the agent 
given a certain level of desired consumption. 
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The solution to this problem can be summarized in the following expressions: 
&P r = ρ + (3)
P 
r =ψ ′ν 2 (4)
C& (2ψ ′ +ψ ′′ν )ν&ρ − β = + (5)
C 1 +ψ +ψ ′ν 
In this economy the Central Bank uses an interest rate rule given by 
&P r& =θ 0 +θ1 −θ 2 r (6)P 
Assume for simplicity that the real assets of the government are being held by the Central 
Bank and that the Bank does not hold any government bonds. Then the Central Bank’s 
budget constraint is given by: 
&MF&G = ρFG + −τ B (7)P 
The interpretation is as follows: The central bank obtains real resources through base
&Mmoney issuance, , and through the real return obtained from its holdings of real assets
P 
( ρFG ). Those resources are used to accumulate more real assets ( F& G ), and to transfer 
profits to the Treasury, (τ B ). Think of FG as the hard currency reserves held by the Central 
Bank. For more details on the setup of the model see Sims (2005). 
The contribution of this section is that I use this model to explore the macroeconomic
implications of three profit transfer rules: A “zero transfer” rule, a rule by which only the
real return of the reserves, ρFG  is transferred to the Treasury, and a rule in which, in 
&addition to ρFG , the Central Bank transfers the amount (P P)FG , that is, the amount of 
goods corresponding to the nominal appreciation of FG, that is, the size of Central Bank 
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profits under the “domestic currency” numeraire. This is the case of “improper” transfer 
that I study in this Section. As in Sims (2005), I assume that the transfer becomes zero 
when seignorage revenue becomes negative. 
4.2 Analysis 
This economy has two equilibria (c.f. Sims, 2005): one with stable inflation and one with 
an explosive inflation (given by an arbitrarily high velocity of money and real money 
balances equal to zero).  This has the following interpretation: even in an environment of 
price stability there are shocks to the economy that could trigger the economy to move from 
the stable equilibrium into the unstable equilibrium. The crux of Sims’ analysis is that this
could not occur if there was a way to make it impossible for the explosive inflation 
situation to be an equilibrium.
Sims (2005) suggests that such can be the case if the Central Bank is prepared to redeem 
the entire stock of money at a given upper bound P* for the price level. Such promise is 
credible only if the Central Bank has enough reserves FG such that M/P* < FG, which 
would prevent the agents to have incentives to contribute to the demonetization of the 
economy, which in turn would produce the hyperinflation. Notice that the M/P* < FG if and 
only if P* FG-M > 0, that is, if the Central Bank has positive net worth at the critical price 
level. 
This means that price stability indeed requires a minimal reserve level, which can be 
computed in such a way to ensure a positive net worth at the critical price level. Below I
show a parametrization of the model that clearly illustrates this.  
Following Sims (2005), consider the case where transaction costs are given by 
ψ ( ) = vv γ (1+φv)   and the economy is initially at a steady state with zero inflation and real 
interest rates equal to 2%. I use this scenario to study the effect of varying the profit
transfer rules on the minimal reserve level that is required to eliminate the explosive 
inflation equilibrium.  
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The policy rule for this experiment is defined by θ0=0.02, θ1=1.2 y θ2=1. The transactions
technology is defined by γ=0.02 y φ=0.3. Consider an unexpected drop in the real interest
rate to 1.8%.  The new stable equilibrium would require a drop in the nominal interest rates
to a new level equal to 0.8%. Imagine, however, that following the drop in the real interest
rates the nominal interest rate adjustment is incomplete as it falls only to 1%. In this case
the resulting price level is above the price level that is consistent with the stable 
equilibrium. This leads to policy actions that steadily drive the interest rates upwards.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of interest rates, velocity of money, the log of money holdings 
and inflation in this economy.  
Whether the Central bank can avoid this explosive price path to materialize depends on its 
initial net worth and its profit transfer rules. Figure 2 shows the ratio of reserves to real 
money balances for the case where the Central Bank transfers zero profits to the treasury
P 
do
t/P
 
for different initial levels of FG (This ratio is above one for a positive net worth for the 
Central Bank). 
Figure 1 

Implications of an insufficient response of r to a drop in ρ
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Figure 2 shows that there is an initial level of FGP/M such that, even if the Central Bank 
initially has negative net worth, it is only a matter of time before the accumulation of
profits drives net worth to the point where the Central Bank can cut inflation by announcing 
that it can redeem the entire stock of money at the current price level. When the reserves to
real money balances ratio is not high enough positive net worth can never be achieved, 
which would make it a matter of time before the Central Bank runs out of reserves. This, in
turn, would make it impossible for the Bank to perform open market operations. In this 
example, the initial reserve level cannot be below 63% of real money balances to guarantee 
price stability.
Figure 2 

Ratio of reserves to real money holdings 

(Case 1: zero profit transfer rule) 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
-0.5 
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Time 
0.63 
0.49 
0.54 
When the profit transfer rule is that of giving the government the real returns yielded by the 
reserves, the initial reserve level necessary to avoid the explosive inflation equilibrium
increases. Figure 3 shows that an initial reserve to real money holdings ratio of 63% is no 
longer sufficient to avoid the explosive inflation equilibrium. In this example the initial 
reserve level cannot be below 72% of real money holdings if the explosive equilibrium is to 
be avoided. 
Fg
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Figure 3 

Ratio of reserves to real money holdings 

(Case 2: transfer of real returns of reserves to the Treasury)
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Consider now the case in which the Central Bank also transfers the nominal appreciation of 
the stock of reserves (our case of improper transfer). This case is interesting because
reaching a ratio of reserves to real money holdings equal to 1 is no longer sufficient to 
avoid the explosive inflation equilibrium. In this case it is necessary for this ratio to be at
least equal to 108% (leading to an seemingly excessive Central Bank capitalization) for the 
Central Bank to avoid the explosive inflation equilibrium, as Figure 4 shows. 
14
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 

Ratio of reserves to real money holdings 

(Case 3: transfer of real returns of reserves plus their domestic appreciation to the Treasury) 
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Let me summarize the lessons that can be extracted from the example above: 
First, to be sure, reserves are not really necessary in the stable equilibrium. Second, to
avoid the explosive inflation equilibrium it is, however, necessary that the Central Bank 
hold a minimal reserve level consistent with an eventual positive net worth for the Central 
Bank. So the reserves are, in the end, a form of contingent backing of the stock of money in 
circulation in a country with weak fiscal institutions. Third, routine transfer of Central Bank 
profits increases the minimum level of reserves required to avoid the explosive inflation 
equilibrium. Fourth, excessive Central Bank profit transfers (such as the ones implied by an 
improper choice of numeraire) require that the Central Bank have both a very high net 
worth and hence a fairly high level of reserves to avoid the explosive inflation. In short: 
there exists a direct relationship between the critical reserve level and the profit transfer 
rule. The more aggressive the profit transfer rule is, the more reserves it is necessary to hold
in the Central Bank to avoid the explosive inflation. 
15
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the analysis allows us to derive a clear rationale for when it is desirable and when it 
is not desirable to transfer Central Bank profits to the Treasury: Given a target level of
foreign reserves, reserves sales should trigger a transfer of profits to the treasury only when 
reserves, net of sales, are above the target level. When reserves, net of sales, are below the 
target reserve level, Central Bank profits should not be transferred, as those profits are 
necessary to replace the target level of reserves without adversely affecting the Central 
Bank’s net worth. The level and sign of these transfers would be irrelevant if the Treasury 
was committed to helping the Central Bank, through additional taxation, avoid a balance 
sheet crisis, shall one become imminent, but the reality of the fiscal institutions in most 
developing countries does not lend credibility to this possibility. 
5. Conclusions 
In this article I show the importance of numeraire choice for the proper computation and 
distribution of Central Bank profits in a country with weak fiscal institutions. I also use a
model initially developed by Sims (2005) to study the relation between the desired level of 
profit transfers to the Treasury and the desired level of foreign currency reserves.  
I show that an improper numeraire choice can dramatically alter the sign and magnitude of 
Central Bank profits. I also show that there is a tradeoff between profit transfer and reserve
levels if the Central Bank wishes to avoid a hyperinflation. Because reserve levels can
serve as “contingent backing” for the stock of money in circulation, an improper choice of 
numeraire can lead to excessive profit transfers, and those in turn can lead to low Central 
Bank capitalization levels which can themselves become a serious threat to the prospect of 
price stability if the Treasury is not committed to helping the Central Bank avoid this
problem. Such are the subtle implications of numeraire choice for monetary policy in 
developing countries. 
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Appendix: Monte Carlo experments on the size of Central Bank profits for the 
Venezuelan economy 
The simulation was prepared as follows. I took as starting point an age distribution of the 
stock of foreign reserves over a four-semester horizon. For the subsequent semester I 
simulated the following variables:
•	 Purchases of foreign reserves 
•	 Sales of foreign reserves
•	 Exchange rate depreciation of the Bolivar against the dollar for the current semester 
and the four previous semesters 
•	 Inflation for the current semester and the four previous semesters 
I modeled these variables as a vector of normally distributed random variables with means,
standard deviations and correlation matrix estimated using data for the period 1990-2003. I
simulated these variables 1000 times and computed the exchange rates at which the current 
stock of reserves were purchased, together with the value of the CPI for those semesters. 
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Out of that information I compute the Central Bank profits for each realization of the
random variables according to three numeraires: the Dollar, the Bolívar and the CPI basket, 
and according to three well-known methods of inventory valuation: FIFO, LIFO and
weighted average. The summary statistics of the simulations can be seen in Table 1 in the 
paper. 
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